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CONFRONTING CANNIBALISM 
Lisa M. Kelly* & Shelby Percival** 
Review of Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko Legal 
Principles: Cree and Anishinabek Responses to Violence 
and Victimization (Univ. Toronto Press, 2018) 
INTRODUCTION 
In their first year of law school, common law students learn 
of a figure who tests the boundaries of state punishment 
and criminal culpability: the cannibal. The cannibals who 
law students encounter are two sailors, Captain Tom 
Dudley and his crewmate, Edwin Stephens, who set sail for 
Australia from Southampton on May 19, 1884.1 Part of a 
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1  Our account of the Mignonette’s voyage and the events that led to the 
trials of Dudley and Stephens draws on the following secondary 
sources: Allan C Hutchinson, Is Eating People Wrong?: Great Legal 
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four-man crew, they were sailing the Mignonette to Sydney 
for its new owner. Almost two months into their journey, 
they were caught in a storm. An enormous wave damaged 
the boat, and Dudley ordered his crew to abandon ship. The 
crew hurriedly lowered the ship’s thirteen-foot lifeboat into 
the water, managing to salvage only two cans of food and 
no drinking water.  
Within two weeks, having eaten all their provisions 
and forced to drink their own urine, the men considered the 
desperate maritime custom of sacrificing one shipman so 
that the others could live. Richard Parker, the crew’s 
seventeen-year-old cabin boy, had become gravely ill after 
drinking seawater and was slipping in and out of 
consciousness. Dudley suggested that they kill Parker to 
save themselves. Dudley eventually slit Parker’s throat and 
the three men consumed him. A few days later, a German 
freighter rescued them. 
From the moment of rescue, the seamen were 
forthright about what they had done. Dudley and Stephens 
believed that the laws of the sea justified killing in such 
 
Cases and How They Shaped the World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Michael G Mallin, “In Warm Blood: Some 
Historical and Procedural Aspects of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens” 
(1967) 34:2 U Chicago L Rev 387; AW Brian Simpson, Cannibalism 
and the Common Law: The Story of the Tragic Last Voyage of the 
Mignonette and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which it Gave Rise 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Andrea Hibbard, 
“Cannibalism and the Late-Victorian Adventure Novel: The Queen v. 
Dudley and Stephens” (2019) 62:3 English Literature in Transition, 
1880–1920 305. 
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dire circumstances.2 At their bail hearing, defense counsel 
urged the magistrates to reconsider the charge of murder.3 
Citing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, the defense reminded the court of “the great 
universal principle of self-preservation, which prompts 
every man to save his own life preferable to that of 
another.” 4  Amongst the seafaring community, popular 
opinion was initially on their side. Fellow seamen 
contributed generously to a legal defense fund, 5  and 
Dudley expressed his “thanks for numerous favours of 
sympathy to myself and companions” in a letter to the 
Times of London.6   
Dudley and Stephens did not fare as well before the 
courts. At trial and on appeal, the presiding judges 
convicted them of murder.7 Shoring up the law of murder 
to apply in cases of maritime calamity, Lord Coleridge 
refused to allow “compassion for the criminal to change or 
 
2  See “The Wreck of the Mignonette”, The Times (9 September 1884) 3. 
3  “The Wreck of the Mignonette”, The Times (12 September 1884) 4. 
4  Ibid. See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol 4 (London: Strathan & Woodfall, 1795) at 185. 
5  See Hibbard, supra note 1 at 308. 
6  Hutchison, supra note 1 at 26.   
7  For a discussion of whether the necessity defense is best conceptually 
defined as an excuse or justification, see Edward M Morgan, “The 
Defence of Necessity: Justification or Excuse?” (1984) 42:2 UT Fac L 
Rev 165 (“[r]ather than compassion for the accused based on the 
presence of an excusing condition, a justification seeks to establish that 
the act for which he is charged did not constitute a criminal offence in 
the first place” at 167). 
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weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime.”8 
However, rather than donning the black hoods that judges 
typically wore when condemning an accused to death, Lord 
Coleridge paired his verdict with a request for royal 
clemency. Six months after their conviction, Queen 
Victoria pardoned Dudley and Stephens.9 
For students of criminal law, the case bearing the 
sailors’ names—R. v. Dudley and Stephens—stands for a 
strict and narrow construction of the necessity defense. 
Though the case captivates law students as a dystopian 
thought experiment come to life, few, if any, learn of the 
case’s political stakes at the time it was decided. This 
historical amnesia cleanses the case of its imperialist roots. 
For the Victorians, the ordeal of the Mignonette and the 
resort to cannibalism by the sailors was about far more than 
the scope or meaning of the necessity defense. At stake 
were fundamental questions about what it meant to be 
human, to be English, and to be civilized. 
Professor Hadley Friedland’s illuminating and 
important book, The Wetiko Legal Principles: Cree and 
Anishinabek Responses to Violence and Victimization, 
analyzes Indigenous legal responses to another cannibal 
figure wholly absent from Canadian legal education to 
date: the wetiko.10 As Friedland writes in the preface, “[t]he 
 
8  R v Dudley and Stephens, [1884] EWHC 2 (QB), 14 QBD 273 [Dudley 
and Stephens]. 
9  Simpson, supra note 1 at 239–41. 
10  See Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko Legal Principles: Cree and 
Anishinabek Responses to Violence and Victimization (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2018).  
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wetiko (or windigo) concept has existed within Cree and 
Anishinabek societies for centuries.”11 While it has often 
been translated into English as “cannibal,” it encompasses 
far more than actual or metaphysical flesh-eating. At base, 
it signals monstrosity. “Beyond the ancient stories of 
cannibal giants who roamed the land,” Friedland writes, 
“the concept is used to describe human beings who do 
monstrous things.”12 
Friedland opens and closes her text with two 
stories—“Sweet Dirt” and “Beyond Sweet Dirt”—that tell 
of haunting but ultimately hopeful encounters with wetikos. 
These bookend stories, as Genevieve Painter has written, 
“frame the book’s pleadings on why the wetiko stories 
count as law,” and “cage the book’s common law 
chapters,” thereby leaving us “free to imagine the worlds 
left outside them.”13Storytelling as legal method provides 
a transformative window into what law can be and who can 
define it.14 
 
11  Ibid at xvi.   
12  Ibid.  
13  Genevieve Painter, “Hadley Louise Friedland: The Wetiko Legal 
Principles: Cree and Anishinabek Responses to Violence and 
Victimization. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018. 144 pp.”, 
Book Review (2019) 34:3 CJLS 557 at 559.  
14  See Hadley Friedland & Val Napoleon, “Gathering the Threads: 
Developing a Methodology for Researching and Rebuilding 
Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2015) 1:1 Lakehead LJ 16; Rebecca 
Johnson & Lori Groft, “Learning Indigenous Law: Reflections on 
Working with Western Inuit Stories” (2017) 2:2 Lakehead LJ 117.  
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The common thread that Friedland pulls through 
these stories is the enduring question of how we should 
protect the most vulnerable from abuse. Friedland’s work 
goes further than simply acknowledging problems of 
physical and sexual abuse. She explains the procedure 
historically used by Cree and Anishinabek peoples when 
dealing with wetiko figures, and in doing so, raises critical 
questions for readers about the Canadian criminal law 
system’s obsessive focus on punishment. The book is 
informed by accounts of Cree Elders and knowledge 
keepers, including wetiko stories that they learned as 
children and that they will pass down to the next 
generation. 
In this essay, we consider the potentially 
transformative role of wetiko stories for Canadian legal 
education. Our aim is not to assimilate wetiko principles 
into dominant legal training. Indeed, we share Friedland’s 
resistance to studying wetiko stories primarily with a view 
to reconciling them with Canadian state law.15 Rather, we 
see in Cree and Anishinabek law important alternatives to 
the punitive impulses that are characteristic of Canadian 
criminal law. Where the English courts took pains to 
condemn Dudley and Stephens as murderers who had 
contravened Englishness itself, Cree and Anishinabek 
peoples confronted monstrousness as a presence within. 
Wetiko stories, Friedland reminds the reader again and 
again, can provide tools for protecting “our children from 
 
15  See Freidland, supra note 10 at 110 (“the most logical place to begin 
further research is not wetiko law’s relationship with Canadian state 
law at all,” Friedland writes. “Rather, the place to begin is within 
Indigenous societies.”).  
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terrible harms caused by people close to us, and [for] 
thinking about how to recognize and respond to people 
close to us who may cause terrible harm to others.” 16 
Acknowledging this closeness provides a very different 
vantage point to the distance that the common law urges 
law students to construct between victims and offenders.  
CANNIBALISM ON THE HIGH SEAS  
Had the Mignonette sailed a century earlier, it is unlikely 
history would remember the names of Dudley or Stephens, 
and certainly not as men convicted of murder. British 
maritime historians have shown how regulatory and 
cultural changes transformed shipping over the long 
nineteenth century.17 Labourers and progressive reformers 
campaigned against the despotic and dangerous maritime 
conditions that caused so many sailors to perish in 
catastrophic and preventable shipwrecks. The eponymous 
Plimsoll lines that mark safe submersion levels on ships—
a corrective against owners who frequently overloaded 
ships and collected insurance payouts when the vessels 
sank with crew on board—originated during this era, as did 
 
16  Ibid at 74. 
17  See Glen O’Hara, “‘The Sea is Swinging into View’: Modern British 
Maritime History in a Globalised World” (2009) 124:510 Eng Hist Rev 
1109.  
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rules on minimum food, water, and accommodation 
provisions for crew.18  
The expansion of maritime regulation coincided 
with and infused larger cultural transformations in English 
seafaring. In popular literature and songs, Victorian 
authors and lyricists recast ships as places of civility. 
Breaking with the tradition of outcaste pirates and 
avaricious captains, “Honest Jack” emerged as an exemplar 
of altruistic and stoic masculinity.19  In 1852, when the 
H.M.S. Birkenhead was transporting troops to fight in the 
Eighth Xhosa War, it sank off the coast of South Africa. As 
it was sinking, the commanding officer allegedly ordered 
the men to stand back to allow seven women and thirteen 
children aboard to be rowed to safety.20 Immortalized in 
Rudyard Kipling’s “Soldier an’ Sailor Too,” the chivalrous 
 
18  See Nicolette Jones, The Plimsoll Sensation: The Great Campaign to 
Save Lives at Sea (London: Little, Brown Book Group, 2006); Leon 
Fink, Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First 
Globalized Industry, from 1812 to the Present (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
19  See Jones, supra note 18 at 15.  
20  See “The Wreck of the Birkenhead” in William OS Gilly, ed, 
Narratives of Shipwrecks of the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1857, 
3rd ed (London: 1864) 348; David Seton, Narrative of the Wreck of the 
‘Birkenhead’ (London, 1890), cited in Lucy Delap, “‘Thus Does Man 
Prove His Fitness to be the Master of Things’: Shipwrecks, Chivalry 
and Masculinities in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain” 
(2006) 3:1 Cult & Soc Hist 45 at 49.  
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ethic of “women and children first” was invented as naval 
tradition.21 
This Victorian ethic of self-sacrifice challenged the 
prevailing maritime custom of resorting to survivor 
cannibalism in cases of shipwreck. The legal historian 
A.W. Brian Simpson, in his work Cannibalism and the 
Common Law, notes that English sailors regularly drew 
lots in cases of starvation to decide both who would die and 
who would do the killing.22 Popular songs, newspapers, 
and literary accounts recounted the macabre tradition. As 
Simpson writes bluntly: “[t]here was nothing whatever 
secret about the matter. What sailors did when they ran out 
of food was to draw lots and eat someone.”23 
By 1884, the year the Mignonette sank, legal and 
cultural tides were turning. Not only was the state 
exercising greater authority over conduct and conditions 
aboard ships, social understandings of cannibalism were 
also changing. Cannibalism—real and imagined—
increasingly became for the English a marker of 
Indigenous barbarism in Africa, the Pacific, and the 
 
21  See Rudyard Kipling, “Soldier an’ Sailor Too” (1893) in The Collected 
Poems of Rudyard Kipling (London: Wordsworth, 2001) (“But to stand 
an’ be still to the Birken’ead drill is a damn tough bullet to chew” at 
447).	
22  See supra note 1.  
23  Ibid at 140.  
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Americas.24 The famed explorer Richard Burton developed 
a taxonomy of thirteen “African stares” after he journeyed 
to the lakes region of East Africa from 1857–1859. Last 
among them was the “stare cannibal”—the savage African 
ready to consume another. 25  Colonial accounts of the 
Pacific Islands likewise depicted Indigenous peoples as 
cannibals. As Tracey Banivanua-Mar observes in her study 
of nineteenth-century colonial discourses about Fiji: 
[c]annibalism epitomized Fiji in Europe, 
Australia, and the United States, where a 
vibrant market emerged in postcards, travel 
narratives, missionary reminiscences, 
exhibits or traveling freak shows displaying 
human [flesh] and other specimens.”26 
By the time that Dudley and Stephens stood trial, 
consuming human flesh evoked a barbarism that Victorians 
sought to vanquish from within and project onto the 
colonial other. 
 
24  Surekha Davies, Book Review of An Intellectual History of 
Cannibalism by Cătălin Avramescu, (2010) 20:2 Intell Hist Rev 275 at 
276 (observing how post-colonial scholarship in recent years has 
shown that “the cannibal has been perceived not only as evidence of 
isolated madness or perversion, but also as a trope that pervades 
colonial writing”).  
25  See Dane Kennedy, The Highly Civilized Man: Richard Burton and the 
Victorian World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) at 
115.  
26  Tracey Banivanua-Mar, “Cannibalism and Colonialism: Charting 
Colonies and Frontiers in Nineteenth-Century Fiji” (2010) 52:2 Comp 
Stud Soc & Hist 255 at 257.  
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Lord Coleridge appealed to this sense of civility in 
upholding the conviction of Dudley and Stephens. Writing 
for a unanimous court, he proffered a vision of English, 
Christian seamen who would fulfill their duties to others 
even to the point of death:  
The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain 
to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of 
soldiers to women and children, as in the 
noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties 
impose on men the moral necessity, not of the 
preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives 
for others, from which in no country, least of 
all, it is to be hoped, in England, will men 
ever shrink, as indeed, they have not 
shrunk.27 
Lord Coleridge breathed into criminal law a Victorian ideal 
of duty-bound masculinity. Where maritime custom had 
once acknowledged and regulated survival cannibalism, 
eating another’s flesh was now cast as anathema to English 
identity. 
By reading this vision of chivalrous and honourable 
English civility into law, Lord Coleridge, like his cultural 
and literary counterparts, elided the realities of imperial 
brutality and privation. The Birkenhead tradition of 
“women and children first”—or, as Lucy Delap more 
accurately describes it, “ladies . . ., [then] . . . white women 
and children” first—was invented on a naval ship carrying 
soldiers to fight a war of conquest against the Xhosa 
 
27  Dudley and Stephens, supra note 8.  
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people.28 In her study of late-Victorian adventure novels, 
Andrea Hibbard observes that valiant heroes served to 
inoculate readers from the “sordid spectacle of voracious 
self-interest exhibited not only by the desperate Dudley and 
Stephens, but on a much larger scale by the ‘scramble for 
Africa’ and the New Imperialism.” 29  The rapacious 
monstrousness at the heart of empire was concealed behind 
a veneer of heroic civility.  
THE MONSTROUS WITHIN 
Reading wetiko stories alongside Dudley and Stephens 
illuminates how imperial distinctions between the human 
and the less-than-human, the civilized and the barbaric, 
indelibly shaped legal systems in the colonies and the 
metropole. At stake in Friedland’s work is the question of 
how societies should conceive of and respond to 
monstrosity. Not only did colonial projections of 
monstrousness onto Indigenous peoples work to justify 
brutal conquest in the name of a civilizing mission, they 
also fueled the punitive response to Dudley and Stephens’ 
act of desperation. This impulse continues to shape 
Canadian criminal law. While Friedland writes first and 
foremost for Indigenous communities, every law student in 
Canada would benefit from learning of the relational logic 
at the heart of Cree and Anishinabek responses to violence 
and victimization. Problems of violence, abuse, suffering, 
and trauma cannot be denied away through projection or 
punishment. Through Friedland’s recovery of wetiko 
stories, we look monstrosity in the face. We see “darkness 
 
28  Delap, supra note 20 at 52.  
29  Supra note 1 at 318. 
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in the daytime.”30 But we also see clear-eyed collective 
responses motivated by protection and repair. And, as such, 
we “feel the brightness too.”31 
Friedland is motivated by a deep concern with the 
violence and victimization that grips too many Indigenous 
communities today. Anguish and hope are palpable in her 
writing. “Nowadays, many Indigenous people are 
grieving,” she laments.32 “They are grieving the memories 
of children and adults lost to violence and victimization, 
both from residential schools and within communities. It’s 
hard to think about what has happened to so many of our 
children.”33 Many Indigenous people “struggle to cope” 
each day with “the horror, loss, and grief” that results from 
“overwhelming” levels of violence.34 Mary Ellen Turpel-
Lafond has long stressed the urgency of the situation: 
[t]he pressing reality is that we have 
unprecedented levels of violence experienced 
in Aboriginal families and communities in 
the current generation, likely connected to the 
 
30  Friedland, supra note 10 at 10.   
31  Ibid at 10. 
32  Ibid at 11. 
33  Ibid at 11–12. 
34  Ibid at 12. 
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intergenerational trauma from the residential 
school experience.35 
Colonial displacement and dispossession, the fracturing of 
families and nations, and the ongoing repression of 
Indigenous traditions have together left communities ripe 
for cycles of abuse to set in over time. 
To make matters worse, the pain of violence and 
abuse is especially acute when inflicted by someone one 
knows and trusts. This is the problem at the core of 
Friedland’s book: how should Indigenous communities 
respond to violence and abuse committed from within? The 
challenge is a dual one of both protection and 
rehabilitation. Rather than condemning those who harm 
children as monstrous outsiders, Friedland acknowledges 
the ties that bind victims and offenders, the vulnerable and 
the broken. Her aim is to find within Indigenous legal 
traditions, specifically wetiko stories, tools, and practices 
to “think about and respond to . . . violence in principled 
and effective ways.”36 
Friedland draws parallels between the tactics, 
characteristics, and possible causes of wetikoism and those 
who abuse and sexually victimize children today. If the 
analogy holds, she argues, then wetiko principles could be 
“usefully applied to the present urgent issue of child 
 
35  The Honourable ME Turpel-Lafond, “Some Thoughts on Inclusion and 
Innovation in the Saskatchewan Justice System” (2005) 68:2 Sask L 
Rev 293 at 295.  
36  Friedland, supra note 10 at 112.  
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victimization.”37 Friedland knowingly treads on dangerous 
ground. The pedophile, the abusive parent, and the 
woefully negligent caregiver attract a level of scorn in 
dominant Canadian society today that marks them as the 
cannibal of old—monstrous figures undeserving of human 
community. As James Kincaid observes in his cultural 
study of child molesting, “the recent translation of ‘sexual 
offenders’ into ‘sexual predators’ transforms these 
particular criminals into ogres, beyond redemption and 
with no claim on human civil rights.” 38  The ogre, the 
predator, and the starving sailor who kills and consumes 
another mark themselves as less than fully human. Or do 
they? 
Rather than vilifying the wetiko as a foreign other, 
Cree and Anishinabek peoples treated those who 
committed monstrous acts as still one of their own. They 
adopted a ladder approach to respond to violence and 
victimization. Friedland shows through oral accounts, 
written records, and interviews that healing was the first 
and most common response to wetikoism. 39  A person 
suspected of becoming a wetiko might be taken to a healer 
or treated to generous hospitality in an effort to treat their 
affliction. As with other responses, healing efforts were 
only undertaken after community members considered all 
the circumstances of a given case. Where healing failed or 
proved insufficient to protect others from harm, 
community members would closely supervise suspected 
 
37  Ibid at 73. 
38  James Kincaid, Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child Molestation 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) at 11.  
39  See Friedland, supra note 10 at 85–86. 
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wetikos, using coercive tactics as necessary.40 Community 
members pursued other measures when necessary, 
including supervision, separation, incapacitation, or, in 
extreme cases, death. 
Building on John Borrows’s work, Friedland 
identifies three features of collective decision-making in 
response to wetiko figures: 
(1) legitimate decisions are collective and 
open; (2) authoritative final decision-makers 
are leaders, medicine people, and the closest 
family members of the wetiko; and (3) there 
are procedural steps to determine legitimate 
and effective responses.41 
These procedural steps include “recognizing and sharing 
information about warning signs,” gathering evidence to 
determine if a person “fits in the wetiko category,” and 
deciding on a response. 42  In contrast to the reactive 
Canadian criminal law, Cree and Anishinabek peoples 
worked to prevent harm. “Intervention to prevent wetiko 
transformations and behaviours is the most consistent 
normative principle in these stories,” Friedland writes.43 
Justice measures were motivated not simply by after-the-
fact repudiation, but instead by a set of interlocking 
 
40  See ibid at 88. 
41  Ibid at 75. 
42  Ibid at 79. 
43  Ibid at 34–35. 
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responsibilities among community members to prevent 
suffering before it occurred. 
LIVING HISTORY 
In harnessing the past to serve the present, Friedland’s 
work reveals the Faulknerian truth that the past is never 
dead; it’s not even past. Law students learn early and often 
that the Canadian Constitution and the common law are 
living trees, not dead wood. And yet, when it comes to 
Indigenous laws and traditions, they regularly learn the 
opposite. They read judicial decisions by the country’s 
highest court that in many cases require Indigenous 
claimants to present backward-looking evidence of 
practices preceding European contact.44 To insist on the 
vitality of Indigenous laws and traditions, as Friedland 
does, is to insist on the vitality of Indigenous peoples. As 
John Borrows has written, “[w]e are not past-tense peoples. 
We should be physically free to travel through space and 
philosophically at liberty to carry our ideas through 
time.”45 Requiring Indigenous peoples to leave their legal 
pasts behind, to treat them as regressive, or to access them 
 
44  See e.g. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; R v Pamajewon [1996] 
2 SCR 821.  
45  John Borrows, “Physical Philosophy: Mobility and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights” in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent 
McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and 
Critical Perspectives (Portland, OR: Hart, 2009) 403 at 419, cited in 
Friedland, supra note 10 at 44. 
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only in calcified form denies them the temporal liberty 
accorded to Canada’s dominant legal system. 46 
Excavating the past can also be fraught with pain. 
This is especially true in the case of Indigenous stories and 
traditions, which were so often weaponized by colonial 
forces to instill a sense of shame. As Frantz Fanon 
observed, internalized shame is the ultimate turn of the 
colonial screw. “By a kind of perverted logic,” Fanon 
wrote, the colonial power 
turns to the past of the oppressed people, and 
distorts, disfigures, and destroys it . . . the 
total result looked for by colonial domination 
was indeed to convince the natives that 
colonialism came to lighten their darkness.47 
Degrading Indigenous pasts advanced that most insidious 
of colonial goals: the native should come to believe that he 
was in need of European provenance. 
One sees this logic at work in the colonial treatment 
of wetiko stories. As Friedland notes, “Canadian 
 
46  See e.g. CF Black, A Mosaic of Indigenous Legal Thought: Legendary 
Tales and Other Writings (New York: Routledge, 2017); John 
Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Lindsay Keegitah 
Borrows, Otter’s Journey through Indigenous Language and Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018); Saliha Belmessous, Native Claims: 
Indigenous Law Against Empire, 1500–1920 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
47  Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance 
Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963) at 210–11.   
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government and courts, as well as academics and 
newspapers have used the wetiko stories to say Indigenous 
people were superstitious, brutal, or uncivilized.”48 Settlers 
used stories of monstrousness to cast Indigenous peoples 
as barbaric. The fact that English maritime custom had long 
recognized survivor cannibalism as legitimate was beside 
the point. Many today feel “cautious, ashamed, or doubtful 
about using the wetiko stories” based on a well-founded 
fear that these stories will once again be turned against 
Indigenous peoples.49 
 Friedland resists this understandable urge to not 
drag stories of monstrousness into the light. For Friedland, 
acknowledging violence and victimization, past and 
present, is necessary to realize different ways of addressing 
wrongdoing. “The wetiko stories are powerful examples of 
Cree and Anishinabek peoples’ profound strength, 
resourcefulness, and teamwork in protecting themselves 
and those they love.”50 Rejuvenating wetiko stories offers 
a set of tools to address violence and victimization beyond 
the punitive logics of repudiation and retribution. More 
importantly, Friedland’s project lays claim to the 
Indigenous humanity that settlers once used these very 
stories to deny: “where in the past the figure of the cannibal 
has been used to construct differences and uphold racism,” 
literary theorist Maggie Kilgour writes, “it now appears in 
 
48  Friedland, supra note 10 at 13. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid.  
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projects to deconstruct them.” 51  In laying bare the 
“ordinariness of human monstrousness,” Friedland 
identifies violence and suffering as unifying rather than 
distinguishing features of humanity.52  
BEYOND “RESTORATIVE JUSTICE”  
Readers may be tempted to treat Friedland’s work as part 
of the now voluminous literature on “restorative justice.” 
For decades, progressive reformers around the world have 
advocated for alternatives to the punitive and managerial 
work of criminal law.53 In contrast to Western criminal law 
systems, which are structured around state–offender dyads, 
restorative justice practitioners advance “a process 
whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the 
 
51  Maggie Kilgour “The Function of Cannibalism at the Present Time” in 
Francis Barker, Peter Hulme & Margaret Iverson, eds, Cannibalism 
and the Colonial World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998) 238 at 242. 
52  Friedland, supra note 10 at 46, citing Lou Marano et al, “Windigo 
Psychosis: The Anatomy of an Emic-Etic Confusion [and Comments 
and Reply]” (1982) 23:4 Current Anthropology 385 at 401 (Ruth 
Landes’s response).  
53  See e.g. Jennifer J Llewellyn & Daniel Philpott, Restorative Justice, 
Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); John Braithwaite, “Setting Standards for Restorative 
Justice” (2002) 42:3 Brit J Crim 563; Kathleen Daly & Julie Stubbs, 
“Feminist Engagement with Restorative Justice” (2006) 10:1 Theor 
Crim 9. We draw the language of “managerialism” from Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control in 
an Age of Broken Windows Policing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2018).  
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future.”54 Key to these processes is the goal of preserving 
and repairing human relationships. “Restorative justice 
must be sought through practices which integrate the 
wrongdoer so they remain in the relationship,” write 
Jennifer Llewellyn and Robert Howse, “and not through 
punishment which isolates the wrongdoer and removes 
them from relationship.” 55  Restorative justice programs 
can provide victims an opportunity to have their voices 
heard in a forum that is attuned to their needs and 
preferences.56 Advocates emphasize that restorative justice 
does not mean that a wrongdoer escapes punishment or 
responsibility. In fact, restorative justice programs often 
require offenders to take responsibility for wrongdoing 
before entering into discussion with individuals or 
communities affected by that wrong.57   
 
54  Tony F Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview (London, UK: 
Home Office, Research Development and Statistics Directorate, 1999) 
at 5. 
55  Jennifer J Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Restorative Justice—A 
Conceptual Framework (Prepared for the Law Commission of Canada, 
1999) at 38.    
56  See e.g. Clare McGlynn, Nicole Westmarland & Nikki Godden, “‘I 
Just Wanted Him to Hear Me’: Sexual Violence and the Possibilities 
of Restorative Justice” (2012) 39:2 JL & Soc’y 213.  
57  See e.g. Anthony Duff, “Alternatives to Punishment—Or Alternative 
Punishments?” in Wesley Cragg, ed, Retributivism and Its Critics: 
Canadian Section of the International Society of Law and Social 
Philosophy (CS, IVR): Papers for the Special Nordic Conference held 
at the University of Toronto, 25–27 June 1990 (Stuttgart: F Steiner, 
1992) (Duff writes “the way in which harm is repaired by the offender 
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However, “restorative justice” is not a term that 
appears in Friedland’s text. The omission is undoubtedly 
purposeful. As it has proliferated across legal contexts, 
restorative justice has gradually gained specific 
connotations, some of which cut against the outcome that 
Friedland seeks. Elsewhere, Friedland has written critically 
with Val Napoleon on the limits of “restorative justice” as 
it is popularly used in Canada.58 In particular, they have 
criticized those who too frequently reduce “restorative 
justice” to healing and then conflate this narrowed concept 
with “Aboriginal justice” generally.59  
 Friedland’s text may be better understood as a 
critical intervention in restorative justice work. The fact 
that she focuses on violence and victimization, including 
sexual abuse, is especially significant. The use of 
restorative justice in the context of sexual violence and 
abuse remains deeply controversial. Skeptics have 
expressed concern that restorative justice programs may re-
victimize vulnerable complainants, trivialize gender-based 
 
through restorative justice processes is important and can include 
alternative forms of punishment, rather than restorative justice 
necessarily being as an ‘alternative to punishment’” at 44), cited in 
McGlynn, Westmarland & Godden, supra note 56 at 217. 
58  See Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, “Indigenous Legal Traditions: 
Roots to Renaissance” in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, eds, The 
Oxford Handbook on Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) 225.  
59  Ibid at 238. See also Chris Cunneen, “Thinking Critically about Restorative 
Justice” in Eugene McLaughlin et al, eds, Restorative Justice Critical Issues 
(London: Sage Publications, 2003) 182.  
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violence, and further endanger victims.60 What Friedland’s 
work demonstrates is that local laws and practices can offer 
modes of protection and repair that the state system has 
failed to provide. Cree and Anishinabek responses to 
wetikoism offer examples of how communities might 
observe and collect information to assist offenders and 
those around them, deal with violent behavior, and provide 
a process for escalating proceedings if help and healing are 
not accepted. 61  As John Borrows has written, “[i]n 
Anishinabek law, legal remedies are not usually punitive. 
However, examples can be found in which drastic action 
had to be taken against individuals to preserve community 
safety.”62 It is simply not the case that Indigenous legal 
traditions lack the tools to deal with forms of monstrous 
violence and victimization that afflict every human society. 
All that said, even as the text elucidates wetiko 
principles and discusses at length the elements that may 
contribute to abuse, Friedland leaves readers without a 
clear sense of how these approaches might operate in 
practice today. What would a new future that attempted to 
deal holistically with underlying causes of wetikoism look 
like? What institutional forms and processes might allow 
for more productive responses to child abuse in Indigenous 
 
60  For a discussion of these debates, see e.g. Angela Cameron, “Stopping 
the Violence: Canadian Feminist Debates on Restorative Justice and 
Intimate Violence” (2006) 10:1 Theor Crim 49; Ruth Lewis et al, 
“Law’s Progressive Potential: The Value of Engagement with the Law 
for Domestic Violence” (2001) 10:1 Soc & Leg Stud 105 at 123. 
61  Friedland, supra note 10 at 109–10. 
62  John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2010) at 81.  
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communities today? Would these initiatives exist in 
relationship with, or wholly separate from, existing 
programs? As more Indigenous nations push for greater 
sovereignty over both child welfare and criminal 
proceedings, these questions will only become more 
pressing. Readers will hope for future work from Friedland 
that will attempt to operationalize her insights. 
CONCLUSION 
Societies define themselves in part by how they understand 
and respond to monstrousness. Recapitulating defenses of 
the individual psyche, societies often project monstrosity 
onto others as a way of rendering themselves pure. In her 
meditation on cannibalism, anthropologist Shirley 
Lindenbaum identifies projection as a common thread. 
“The common factor in the history of cannibal allegations,” 
Lindenbaum writes, “is the combination of denial in 
ourselves and attribution of it to those who we wish to 
defame, conquer, and civilize.”63  This is the imperialist 
posture at the heart of Dudley and Stephens—a posture that 
has been erased over time in legal training that abstracts the 
case from its historical and material context. When Lord 
Coleridge deemed survivor cannibalism an offence against 
Englishness, he implicitly conjured the savage cannibal in 
need of English saving. 
Unmasking the history of English survivor 
cannibalism and the colonial imperative to criminalize it 
reveals only half the picture. Hadley Friedland’s work is 
 
63  Shirley Lindenbaum, “Thinking About Cannibalism” (2004) 33 Ann 
Rev Anthro 475 at 491.  
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daring because she refuses to deny or look away from 
monstrousness. In doing so, she steps outside of the 
colonial mindset altogether. She is not interested in denial 
as a defence against the colonizer’s dehumanizing 
projections. Instead, what drives Freidland’s text is a 
humane and pragmatic invitation to Cree and Anishinabek 
peoples to draw on their own traditions to address violence 
and victimization today.  
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